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figure. However, hopefully, our programme will generate more qualitative information. 
The way we approach it is similar to storytelling: what are the practices that the 
artists came across while cooperating with other organizations; what did they learn; 
what aspects went wrong and how did the cooperating partners cope with it? As The 
Art of Impact, we are more interested in the dynamics and processes through which 
the partners arrived at an end product, and then, of course, in the end product itself. 
This is the starting point for the research.
KL: Are you, then, researching the impact on the producers or on the communities with 
which these producers or artists are working? What are you actually researching in 
regard to these projects? 
MM: In my opinion it can be both in the end. But what we are very much interested in 
is the process: how do you get there? It’s a kind of journey that the artists enter into 
with their partners. We try to analyse what they come across and what it means for 
them and for the cooperation. We are interested in how the process affects the coop-
eration and the end result, the goals they are aiming [to achieve]. 
TG: There are many different questions that can be touched upon by a work of art, or 
how they [artists] try to change perceptions of a certain topic. For me, I would like 
to think about impact as a change [that occurs] around a certain issue. This change 
could be the attitude of the people that are involved or the rules of the mechanism 
working around a certain issue. Are the people showing different kinds of behaviour 
or using a different language as a consequence of the project? Are there other goals 
they are focusing on? It could be on all these different levels that the change is being 
made through the collaboration.
KL: Previously you mentioned that this subsidy seeks to support sustainable projects. 
However, The Art of Impact is a temporary fund. In your opinion, how does the 
temporary nature of this subsidy affect the sustainability of the projects?
MM: We started the programme with the awareness that it would only last two years, 
and we try to see it as an experiment, as an opportunity to research the processes 
and dynamics of the funded projects. Therefore, this programme, in a way, is a pilot 
to learn lessons for the future and maybe one of these lessons is that public funds do 
not invest enough in long-term projects, or that there is not enough time to create the 
right context in which the artists want to operate.
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AGENTS OR OBJECTS OF DISCONTINUOUS 
CHANGE? BLAIRITE BRITAIN AND THE ROLE OF 
THE CULTUREPRENEUR
Josephine Berry
In his epoch-defining book on the knowledge economy, Living on Thin Air, Charles 
Leadbeater advanced a crucial formulation: “The more rapid and discontinuous the 
nature of knowledge creation within an industry, the more conducive it is for entre-
preneurship.”1 When seeking to understand the rise of the ‘cultural entrepreneur’ — or 
culturepreneur — in Britain in the 1990s, it is important to keep in mind how profound 
the experience of ‘rapid and discontinuous change’ was during this time. In a sense, the 
rise of the entrepreneur per se, as an economic ideal and governmental fetish, registers 
a popular awakening to the effects of a full-scale implementation of neoliberal policies 
and their engineering of endemic economic instability. Such policies swept away the 
social and economic compacts that had undergirded and stabilized society since the end 
of the Second World War. To contend with the ‘creative destruction’ of globalized and 
deregulated trade, the welfare state thus began its transition into the innovation state.
But beyond merely registering this systemic instability, the fetishized figure of 
the entrepreneur provided a conduit by which a general economic condition could be 
converted into a set of personal responsibilities and motivations. Neoliberalism demanded 
that an entirely new model of subjectivity be born. In 1990s Britain, it was the invented 
and unlikely figure of the cultural entrepreneur who most embodied the risk-taking 
individualism that was given as the model of success for thriving in new economic times. 
Here we will look at how this contradictory figure was engineered, and its lasting impact 
on the cultural landscape.
Fordism’s demise in the early 1970s had brought about the end of jobs for life or 
the notion of a lifelong career. The end of economic stability had also, however, left 
governments with a historic opportunity. Finally, the on-going argument between those 
who believed that the collective insurance of the welfare state was an essential buffer 
to the market’s destructive pursuit of profit, and those who believed that welfare costs 
were unaffordable could be settled. As an apparently unavoidable 
consequence of the changes in economic conditions, the social would 
now become entirely integrated into the economic. Neoliberalism is 
a political ideology that subjects all aspects of life (social, economic, 
biological, cultural, personal) to an economic judgement or audit; it is 
a perspective that no longer permits of any outside to the economic. 
In this respect, we can say that society as a whole was entrepreneuri-
alized as an effect of neoliberalism. But below we will look specifically 
at culture, rapidly becoming the great white hope of deindustrialized 
times, and the story of its entrepreneurialization in ‘Creative Britain’.2
ENTREPRENEURIAL SALVATION
As Jacques Donzelot argues in his essay ‘Pleasure in Work’, at the 
very centre of this change is the transformation of the subject of 
rights who disidentifies with work into the subject of change who 
embraces and takes pleasure in work.3 The Fordist worker, protected 
by statutory rights but threatened by unemployment and hence 
economic obsolescence, had become a real problem for government 
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and the economy alike. The worker’s rigidity and resistance to retraining had become 
both unaffordable for the public purse and a drag on the commercial need to innovate 
and compete in a global marketplace. By Donzelot’s account, alienation from work and 
statutory rights were two sides of the same coin. The development of lifelong training, 
or formation permanante as it is called in France, as a standard technique of workplace 
practice from the end of the 1970s, and increasingly a condition of welfare provision from 
the 1980s, was therefore an essential aspect of neoliberalizing societies. This technique 
was able to integrate the ‘right’ of the worker to constant on-the-job training with the 
requirements of capital. The social molecule of neoliberal society is thus the devel-
opment of what Foucault described as the entrepreneurial self.4 Donzelot exposes the 
parallels between lifelong learning and the entrepreneurial attitude by quoting Bertrand 
Schwartz, the French educationalist who helped to develop its principles:
The objective of Formation Permanente is to make every person capable of 
becoming an agent of change, capable that is of an improved understanding of 
the technical, cultural and social world that surrounds him, and of acting upon 
and changing the structures within which he lives. It aims to give everyone an 
awareness of his power as an active being […].5
The individual is made autonomous at the same time that their social and economic 
environment is defined as one of change; these new subjective freedoms come at the 
cost of perilous and permanent insecurity. Although written in 1971, this description of 
permanent formation works well as a description of the more contemporary figure of 
the ‘cultural entrepreneur’ or ‘creative worker’. Pleasure in work is, after all, what cultural 
occupations have traditionally offered as recompense for chronic insecurity. It is also 
crucial to emphasize here that neoliberalism espouses a model of the subject that is 
both individually autonomous and yet collectively responsible. It becomes our duty to 
develop our skills and exercise our entrepreneurialism in order not to become a burden 
on collective resources and to help innovate and drive forward social and economic 
processes that will benefit all.6 At the same time, it becomes the duty of the government 
to empower all individuals and businesses through the creation of opportunities for 
self-realization. This is the role of the so-called ‘enabling state’ which must provide 
what New Labour leader and prime minister Tony Blair called “competitive individualism 
within a moral framework”.7
Thus the political transformations brought about by the crisis of the Fordist/welfare 
state model entailed a remaking of society in the image of the economy, or rather, 
the neoliberal economy importantly characterized by Joseph Schumpeter’s theory. For 
Schumpeter, an Austrian economist who became a key neoliberal figurehead, economic 
disequilibrium is nothing to be feared but rather a sign of economic 
health. This idea was set out in his 1943 book, Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy where he describes capitalism, with its on-going 
discovery of new markets, production techniques, and forms of organ-
ization as a process of incessant ‘mutation’, one that:
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating 
a new one. This processes of Creative Destruction is the 
essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists 
in, and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.8
Like Marx, Schumpeter believed that capitalism’s inherent dynamic would lead ulti-
mately to its own destruction. However Schumpeter’s theory formulates destruction as 
the source of the system’s own salvation — albeit a dynamic that will eventually over-
whelm it. While every source of profit in a capitalist economy must eventually dry up 
due to the tendency of the market to imitate, saturate, and exhaust all innovations, such 
incessant levelling of difference also impels the creative thinking of the entrepreneur. 
Indeed for Schumpeter, economic value, or growth, does not derive from the surplus 
value extracted from labour time — as in Marx’s labour theory of value — but from 
entrepreneurial innovation itself. Entrepreneurial creativity is itself as real an input into 
economic development as other factors of production — land, labour, and capital — and 
is in fact the decisive one that increases the total sum of values. While, for Schumpeter, 
socialist societies have no real mechanism for creative destruction, and therefore stag-
nate, capitalist societies impel the entrepreneur and are therefore innovative, dynamic, 
and expansive. 
Before exploring in specific detail the nature of cultural entrepreneurship, it is 
also worth making two further observations. When Peter Drucker wrote his definitive 
theory of entrepreneurialism in 1985, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, he observed 
that while ‘smokestack’ industries had been haemorrhaging jobs since the 1970s, the 
US was undergoing more overall job creation than ever before in peace time.9 This 
seemed to run contrary to common sense, since by 1984 the big Fortune 500 compa-
nies had permanently lost four to six million jobs, and the public sector had shrunk 
due to the slowing birth rate.10 Yet since this permanent shrinkage had occurred, forty 
million new jobs had been added to the economy in small to medium sized businesses. 
Unsurprisingly, given the subject of the book, Drucker put this extraordinary anomaly 
down to the emergence in the US of a culture of entrepreneurship in which individuals 
were prepared to undertake risks and ‘work like demons’ creating their own start-ups 
rather than work in big companies and face uncertain futures. As I will discuss in 
more detail below, Drucker also attributes this cultural and psychological change to the 
rise of management techniques that had been transforming American society since 
the First World War. He writes: “Management is the new technology (rather than any 
specific new science of invention) that is making the American economy into an entre-
preneurial economy.”11 For Drucker, management is a social technique that changes the 
yield of resources or the value and satisfaction obtained by consumers from resources: 
an inherently entrepreneurial innovation. Here, he uses the McDonald’s restaurant chain 
as a key example, since they invented nothing except the process through which staff 
are trained and provided with the tools to deliver simple hamburgers in an efficient, 
fast, and standardized form to the customer. However, what is also very interesting 
about Drucker’s account is the spin he gives entrepreneurship. Unlike advocates such 
as Schumpeter, Drucker emphasizes the socially stabilizing effects of entrepreneurship 
in the context of ‘creative destruction’. Where the contemporary economic climate of 
the mid-1980s and its systematic destruction of big businesses was posing what he 
called a “genuine social threat to employment, financial stability and 
social order”, and with the prospect of blue collar jobs shrinking by 
a third within the next twenty-five years, it was essential for existing 
businesses to learn to be successful entrepreneurs.12 It is in this light, 
I think, that we should also see the discourse and policies that came 
to cluster around the cultural entrepreneur in the Blairite Britain of 
the late 1990s.
12
Ibid.
13
Hewison, op. cit. (note 2).
14
Geoff Mulgan, cited in Hewison, op. cit. 
(note 2), p. 22.
15
Charles Leadbeater and Kate Oakley, The 
Independents: Britain’s New Cultural 
Entrepreneur, London: Demos, 1999. 
Accessed through: www.demos.co.uk/files/
theindependents.pdf, on 8 May 2016.
16
While ‘Cool Britannia’ was originally a 
pop song by Bonzo Dog Doo Dah Band in 
1967, and later registered by Ben & Jerry’s 
as an ice cream flavour in 1996, it was 
subsequently adopted by Conservative and 
Labour parties alike in the run-up to the 
1997 elections to articulate the new cultural 
euphoria generated by Britpop and the 
YBAs.
fig. 1  Just prior to Freeze private view. From Left to right: Ian Davenport, Damien Hirst, Angela Bulloch, Fiona Rae, Steve Parks, Anya 
Gallaccio, Sarah Lucas and Gary Hume. August 1988. (Photo: Abigail Lane © Abigail Lane. All Rights Reserved, DACS 2016)
28 29CULTURAL POLICIES: AGENDAS OF IMPACT
ENGINEERING A HYBRID? THE RISE OF THE CULTUREPRENEUR
In a sense, the discovery and hype of the cultural entrepreneur in the 1990s could be 
described as an act of entrepreneurship in its own right. Cultural creativity which had, 
by and large, been regarded as something fairly peripheral to the real economy, was 
discovered and converted into a resource of both national pride and economic growth: 
the ‘cultural and creative industries’. It took an act of innovation to transform cultural 
creativity into a profit yielding resource. Furthermore, the discovery of this resource 
also entailed a very real desire to use it to help stabilize the economy more widely in 
times of discontinous, often disastrous change, as per Drucker’s proposal; a very difficult 
balancing act to pull off.
To retrace this a little, and with the help of cultural historian Robert Hewison’s 
excellent account of Creative Britain, the discovery of creativity as an economic resource 
emerged gradually from the early to mid-1990s.13 It was heavily bound up with attempts 
to reinvent the Labour Party in the guise of the centrist New Labour. A makeover also 
known as Third Way politics, named as such for its apparent marriage of state social 
provision and market economics, but today redolent of attempts to kill off the socialist 
ambitions of the party for good. Part of the rebranding of Labour entailed the need to 
align itself with the ‘new economy’ or ‘knowledge economy’ and to dissociate from the 
blue collar workers who were, according to Leadbeater, ‘melting into thin air’.
Geoff Mulgan, director of the centre-left thinktank Demos, which would greatly 
influence New Labour’s policies, had long criticized the gulf that existed between the 
“sphere of independent production and a tightly controlled, class-based sphere of public 
funding”.14 What he and others on the left were critical of, informed in no small part 
by the growing influence of cultural studies, was how government policy replicated 
cultural hierarchies. On the one hand, the government funded public culture, according 
to arms length principles, through a fairly unaccountable series of public bodies and 
their committees. On the other hand, commercial media had massified an almost entirely 
unsupported popular culture that didn’t receive such funding. Yet it seemed to be the 
unsupported, entrepreneurial currents in culture that were gaining all the attention 
at this time. This disconnect between public funding, cultural policy, and economic 
development strategies is part of what Leadbeater and Kate Oakley called the ‘missing 
middle’ that, as they argued in their The Independents report of 1999, must be bridged 
in order to build up the creative economy and help it withstand global competition.15
Just a few years earlier, a new cultural wave had been formed by the twin 
phenomena of Britpop and the Young British Artists or YBAs. Britpop bands such 
as Oasis and Blur consciously and nostalgically evoked Britain in the swinging (and 
booming) 1960s, while the YBAs had grown up learning to fend for themselves in the 
dark years of Thatcherism. In 1988, their main representative and most consummate 
culturepreneur, Damien Hirst, had convinced the London Docklands Corporation to 
let him curate the group show Freeze in the London Port Authority Building in Surrey 
Docks (fig. 1). It caught the attention of advertising multi-millionaire 
and art collector Charles Saatchi who became a key patron, as well 
as Nicholas Serota, director of Tate, who made a high profile visit to 
the show. The spirit of the times seemed to be abolishing old cultural 
hierarchies, and that spirit was understood to be quintessentially 
entrepreneurial. While some identified themselves proudly, if slightly 
ironically, as British while others did not, this fresh crop of talent was 
blended together into a new brand dubbed ‘Cool Britannia’ that would 
be touted by New Labour after their election.16 When prominent 
figures such as Oasis member Noel Gallagher publicly endorsed New Labour after their 
landslide victory in 1997, Cool Britannia and the youthful, modernizing spirit of New 
Labour were briefly fused in public perception. 
This is more than a background event to New Labour’s development of an entirely 
new approach to cultural policy; by some force of media synergy, Cool Britannia had 
helped Labour win a landslide election after decades in the political wilderness. With 
the help of the mainstream media and the World Wide Web, the newly democratized 
forces of culture were also making big waves both at home and abroad. The epoch 
defining YBA exhibition, Sensation (1997), stereotypically British films like Four Weddings 
and a Funeral (1994), and pop hits such as Pulp’s Common People (1995), seemed to 
show Britain as exerting a powerful degree of cultural influence on the global stage 
far in excess of its size. In 1988, John Myserscough had written a report called ‘The 
Economic Importance of the Arts’, which was one of the first to quantify the contri-
bution of the arts to the GDP, at around 1.28%.17 A decade later, in 1998, Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith, commented that 
the convergence of culture and media revealed, “a whole industrial 
sector that no one hitherto has even conceived of as an industry.”18 
The Creative Industries Task Force, established by the government 
the year before, in 1997, was the first to synthesize a scattered field 
of activities into the ‘cultural and creative industries’ in their Mapping 
Document — published first in 1998, and then in revised form in 2001. 
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For all the buzz of discovery, New Labour were confronted with the very real 
problem of how to draft effective policy for this brand new industrial sector that was 
punching so high above its weight yet lacking any structural coherence. Here, the entre-
preneurial individual enters the stage once more, this time not as the subject of workplace 
self-management and lifelong learning, but as an elusive figure sitting at the intersection 
between creative ideas and new technologies, zones of esoteric knowledge, and the prod-
ucts, distribution channels, and markets of the future — a master of the ‘art of combina-
tions’, in Schumpeter’s formulation. If creativity was to be industrialized, it needed to be 
locatable in an amenable form or figure, and the culturepreneur seemed to offer just that. 
The new economy had been producing some veritable giants of entrepreneurship — most 
notably Bill Gates — that helped sell this new, abstract figure.19 In Leadbeater’s Living on 
Thin Air, Bill Gates is described as the archetypal ‘knowledge entrepreneur’: “someone 
who has built a global business from virtually nothing on the basis of 
a few good ideas and some ruthless commercial strategy.”20
Leadbeater’s 1999 book was a de facto mission statement for the 
Blairite policy on stimulating the knowledge economy that carried an 
endorsement by Tony Blair on its cover. In it, Leadbeater emphasizes 
the nearly alchemical power of the new economy to turn know-how, 
good instincts, and ideas into money (while all details of Gates’ years 
of coding graft, not to mention those of the wider developer commu-
nity remained unacknowledged). His definition of the ‘knowledge 
entrepreneur’ is closer to Schumpeter than to Drucker, emphasizing 
personality traits such as ruthlessness, charisma, confidence, inquis-
itiveness, imagination and above all the ability to act on instinct. By 
contrast, Drucker stresses time and again that entrepreneurialism is 
based on a systematic approach to innovation: “it is behaviour rather 
than a personality trait” he writes, and adds, “the entrepreneur always 
searches for change, responds to it, and exploits it as an opportunity.”21 
And locating or pre-empting change is for Drucker the result of a 
systematic search, not something that happens to the entrepreneur 
when the muse kisses him.22 Leadbeater doesn’t deny the need for 
systematicity, but he rolls together creative invention with business 
innovation. On the one hand, the TV cook Delia Smith is upheld as 
a paragon, able to turn her know-how and craft into a successful 
product line. On the other, he admits that knowledge-based businesses 
often bring together two partners: “one with the ideas, the other with 
the business skills.”23 Yet what defines a successful idea, and where 
does creativity really lie? Is ‘the commercial application of creativity’ 
defined by the Windows operating system, a top charting pop song 
or the conversion of the traditional hamburger into a management 
science? This confusion between creativity and systematic innovation 
will constantly return to haunt not just theories of the knowledge and 
cultural entrepreneur, but the creative industries sector in general. 
DISCONTINUOUS CHANGE OR SYSTEMATIC DOMINATION?
But confusion, such as that produced by discontinuous change, 
also creates the essential conditions in which the entrepreneur can 
seize opportunities. As Leadbeater explains, “[e]ntrepreneurs in new 
industries exploit gaps created by disagreements over the value of a new idea; they 
thrive on the short-sighted arrogance of large companies.”24 Being able to see through 
the fog of ideas and rapid churn of new businesses and products is at least half the art. 
In Leadbeater and Oakley’s 1999 The Independents report, written for Demos, in which 
the term ‘cultural entrepreneur’ was first popularized, the creative urban milieu is itself 
characterized in conflictual terms: “[c]reative places are rarely settled and cosy; they are 
usually in the midst of battles between ‘old’ and ‘new’ sources of wealth, income and 
identity.”25 Seeing potential in the decline of the old, and having the social and economic 
power to act on this, is thus necessary for finding the differentials (such as rent gaps) in 
which future profits lie. This is a differential entirely absent from today’s purpose built, 
high-rent creative quarters. However, the role of high rents in levelling off potential 
culturepreneurial returns on risk-taking is a topic worthy of its own dedicated discus-
sion — Richard Florida’s creative quarters immediately having become unaffordable for 
the very ‘creatives’ who settled them.
Implicit in this image of discontinuous change and the entrepreneurial gift for 
seeing or systematically creating the future is the high propensity for failure; something 
that is acknowledged by all theories of the entrepreneur, old or new, cultural or indus-
trial. For Drucker, this is often a consequence of mistaking technological invention for 
entrepreneurial innovation. In 1985, he cautioned: “Most of Silicon Valley […] are still 
inventors rather than innovators, still speculators rather than entrepreneurs.”26 Leadbeater 
and Oakley are also highly sensitive to the trade-off cultural entrepreneurs are willing 
to make between autonomy and insecurity, outlining their general model of survival 
on a combination of project work, e-lancing, and job hopping. Here they emphasize 
the youthfulness of the sector, which suggests the difficulty of maintaining this form 
of work long-term, especially when family commitments develop — a problem quickly 
identified by creative economy theorist Angela McRobbie.27
Creativity, we must conclude, is not necessarily a direct tool of entrepreneurship, 
but often entrepreneurship is required as a necessary means for supporting the creativity 
that makes work meaningful and pleasurable for the post-Fordist worker. Engineering 
the necessary cocktail of creativity and business skills is in fact the main aim of the 
policy recommendations outlined in ‘The Independents’, revealing how Britain’s new 
cultural entrepreneur was less a sociological type than a figure yet to be created through 
targeted policies. The fragility of the many culturepreneurial microbusinesses discussed 
in the report relates to what Leadbeater and Oakley see as the former’s ‘ambivalence’ 
towards the market and making money: “[i]n ways they are non-materialistic. They are 
prepared to earn relatively little — most people we interviewed were earning £10,000 to 
£20,000 [per annum] — for long periods as the price of doing what they want to do.”28 
Nevertheless, they continue. This doesn’t mean culturepreneurs are 
into ‘art for art’s sake’; but rather than wanting to entrepreneurialize 
their way to success, they want to ‘have a hit’ or ‘be discovered’.29
Herein lies the heart of the contradiction. For many of the 
graphic designers, coders, animators, web designers, and fashion 
designers interviewed for their report, entrepreneurialism is in 
fact a quite foreign logic and behaviour. As Drucker says, when 
a family business opens another restaurant, they take a risk, but 
they do not innovate. This can equally well be said of a small web 
design company taking on a new member of staff. By contrast, he 
continues, when Cyrus McCormick invented instalment buying for 
agricultural machinery in the early twentieth century, farmers were 
able to buy harvesting machines out of future earnings, not past 
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savings. McCormick was an innovator because he 
endowed a new resource — future earnings — with 
the capacity to create wealth. One could say the 
same of the decision to fuse the computer with the 
mobile phone to create smart phones. As mentioned 
above, Drucker argues that together with innova-
tion, the basic ‘techné’ or useful knowledge required 
for entrepreneurship is, above all, management. 
What is striking here is the distance between 
notions of management and notions of creativity, 
for a key aspect of management is its power to 
impose order, uniformity, and unity across differ-
ences. For instance, management enables people 
with different skills and knowledge to work together 
in a coordinated organization. This production of 
systems of integration and uniformity is, at least 
from a conventional standpoint, the very opposite of 
creativity’s singularizing power. 
Having the expertise and time to develop 
effective management techniques on the one hand, 
and to innovate new resources for wealth creation on the other, requires systematicity 
in itself as well as the breathing operational space that usually comes at the cost of a 
business’s core productive activity. All this begs the question, how do you systematically 
manage creativity? Eschewing this conundrum, as Leadbeater and Oakely point out, the 
culturepreneur tends to cherish the intimate and creative character of their business rather 
than the creation of new resources and markets, with few ever even going to a bank or 
outside investor to raise money. Their maxim is to “work hard and stay balanced”.30
Again, Drucker is emphatic: it is the existing, successful operation that is an 
obstacle to entrepreneurship. Operating anything from an industrial plant to a prod-
uct-line to a distribution system requires constant effort to deal with daily crises: 
“existing operations demand and deserve priority treatment”, he insists.31 It takes a 
special effort for an existing business to become entrepreneurial, and existing resources 
tend to be allocated to existing production. This is where management and innovation 
really come together in his description, for to innovate requires a highly managerial 
approach to running a business. 
Innovation, in other words, must be systematically cultivated through making it 
attractive and beneficial to managers and staff, through reallocating resources from 
present production, and risking the disruption of the current business model in the 
process (which is what, for Schumpeter, did not happen in the Soviet Union). Reading 
Drucker, it is easy to understand the reasons for Google employing such a panoply of 
game activities, forums, therapies, practices, and values conducive to brain storming in 
its famous ‘campus style’ Googleplex and outer-ring of bought-out start ups. But while 
knowledge economy success stories like Google, Microsoft, and Apple were talked up by 
Leadbeater as converting thin air into hard cash, the reality is that their successes rely on 
many ‘hidden’ yet all too tangible and historically rooted relations of geopolitical advan-
tage and exploitation — not just entrepreneurial verve.32 Hardly a matter of thin air, and 
hardly irrelevant to the prospects of would-be cultural entrepreneurs. 
This may all seem rather distant from the question of culture-
preneurship, yet the two are intimately related. As Leadbeater and 
Oakley worried in 1999, the UK was in danger of creating industries 
dominated by ‘digital craft producers’, who were all too liable to go bust or be “domi-
nated by larger international groups that will control distribution and publishing of their 
products”.33 The irony is that knowledge economy boosters like Leadbeater and Richard 
Florida have used the example of Bill Gates and Steve Jobs to promote the figure of the 
cultural entrepreneur, while at the same time much of their policy relates to the kinds 
of small to medium sized businesses that are highly vulnerable to the inequalities of the 
global marketplace posed by giants such as these. This marketplace inequality makes 
the millennial entrepreneurship of the creative economy impossible to compare to the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century flowering of entrepreneurship which Drucker 
and Leadbeater both hark back to in glowing and nostalgic terms. This mythical time of 
business creation happened in the absence of the ruthless Darwinism of today’s global 
market place intensified by digital networks, hostile mergers, and financial instruments. 
This begs the question at what point the forces of creative destruction start to over-
whelm the power of the entrepreneur to take advantage of them?
It is a telling fact that, according to Robert Hewison’s account, it was the music 
magazine the New Musical Express (NME) that called time on Cool Britannia when it 
ran the Sex Pistol Johnnie Rotten’s slogan, ‘Ever get the feeling you’ve been cheated?’ 
on its cover in March 1998 (fig. 3). This issue poured scorn on New Labour’s introduction 
of its workfare-style benefit misleadingly called the New Deal (not to be confused with 
Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s), whose stated purpose was to reduce unemployment 
by providing training, subsidized employment, and voluntary work to the unemployed. 
The benefit would be withdrawn from anyone who ‘refused reasonable employment’. 
Thus, as we saw at the outset, entrepreneurialism, or flexibilization, was used as much 
as a disciplinary tool with which to attack the defences of working class militancy as it 
was to create an ideal social type. The 1990s creative workers were likewise exposed to 
this two-pronged attack: both deprived of the state provision which formerly provided 
resources for creative production (such as those enjoyed by Brit Pop bands), and 
demanded to create as a matter of economic survival or a prerequisite of contemporary 
forms of employment.
One of further difficulty for today’s ‘creatives’ is that they seem to have no simple 
or single position within the economy. Despite Florida’s attempts to identify artists, 
musicians, actors, performers, filmmakers, and designers as the ‘super 
creative core’ around which both professional and service classes 
concentrically cluster, as Hewison writes, 
The reality for creators of expressive value was that they 
are not at the core of anything. In Britain they depend on a 
network that includes the education sector, the subsidized 
cultural sector, and the all-important publicly funded 
BBC — as well as purely commercial enterprises, which also 
often depend on the publicy supported part of the network to 
generate the content from which they can profit.34
Seen in this light, cultural entrepreneurship appears as the way to 
justify the withdrawal of public funding, fictionalizing a hybridization 
of creativity and business acumen. In reality these two qualities are 
usually either inimical or extremely difficult to integrate in the absence 
of meaningful public interventions such as subsidized workspaces, 
commissions, training, consultancy, or loans. In 2007, the Work 
Foundation published Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance 
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of the UK’s Creative Industries, and concluded that there was a strong case for ‘public 
investment’, i.e. subsidy for those creators of the ‘expressive core’. But instead, 2011 saw 
the Arts Council budget cut by 29.6%. The situation is quite circular: without funding, 
cultural producers are compelled to entrepreneurialize or change careers altogether. 
Thus ‘pleasure in work’ is becoming ever more nakedly an alibi for the imposition 
of ‘formation permanente’ and its economic analogue, creative destruction. While the 
entrepreneur historically implied the catalyzing ‘agent of change’ referred to by Schwartz 
and eulogized by Schumpeter, today it tends to be associated with obligatory and 
conformist forms of subjectivity. Thus, paradoxically, free creative action is imposed on 
workers, artists, and capitalists alike as a generic behavioural injunction within a highly 
precarious economic climate. The values of creativity are everywhere lauded, yet in 
their forced embrace with entrepreneurship, hunted back to a minimum of possibility. 
As mass creative workers we are all thus increasingly objects, not subjects, of discontin-
uous change. And as we have seen, entrepreneurialism is something quite distinct from 
cultural or technological invention, requiring time, management skills, organizational 
resources, and the right kind of instincts. In the UK and beyond, the impact of culture’s 
enforced entrepreneurialization is still emerging. Yet what seems undeniable is that for 
those working in the creative sector, whether hub or rim, their output will need to be 
highly market compatible if they are to stand a hope of surviving. The toll this will take 
on what once was called autonomous or critical culture is apparent. In the increasing 
absence of any alternatives, the age of the culturepreneur is at last truly upon us. 
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